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QUESTION FOR REVIEW 
WAS IT REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO 
REFUSE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT DRIVER FLED THE 
SCENE AFTER STRIKING PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN? 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported at 
Fisher v. Trapp, 73 Utah Adv. Rpt. 105 (January 7, 1988). 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision being reviewed was entered on January 
7, 1988. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing was filed on 
January 21, 1988; the petition was denied on February 1, 
1988. 
Jurisdiction in this court is provided by Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(5) (amended 1986). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The Utah authority most nearly determinative is 
State v. Franklin, 7 35 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987); State v. Bales, 
675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983); State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 
236 P.2d 1077 (1951) . 
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;
 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
Fisherf a child pedestrian, was injured when 
defendant Trappfs vehicle struck him. Fisher brought this 
action for damages for his injuries. The case was tried to 
a jury, which found Trapp not negligent. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the judgment. 
2. Statement of Facts. 
Trapp struck Fisher as he crossed Redwood Road on 
foot. Trapp fled the scene, but returned a few minutes 
later. He left the scene a second time, but returned 
shortly afterward. Trapp spoke with a police officer, but 
failed to admit that he was the driver who hit Fisher* 
Trapp again left the scene and went home. Later, his wife 
convinced him to call the police and admit his involvement 
in the accident. 
At an in camera hearing before trial, Trapp 
admitted the foregoing facts (R. 270). His attorney argued 
that Fisher should be barred from presenting evidence of 
Trapp's hit-and-run. The trial court found that the 
probative value of Trappfs flight was substantially 
outweighed by possible unfair prejudice. 
0 
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Fisher was unable to remember anything about the 
accident because of his injuries (R. 303). Trapp testified 
that he was paying proper attention to the road, (R. 298, 
299). Evidence of Trapp's hit-and-run was not admitted; a 
jury found no cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE TO 
DETERMINE WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS 
DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRECEDENT 
SET BY THIS COURT ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF "FLIGHT" 
The Court of Appeals admitted that this court "has 
not addressed whether evidence of flight from the scene of 
an accident is admissible in a civil action for negligence." 
(106). However, this court has ruled on the admissibility 
of flight evidence in recent criminal cases. In State v. 
Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987), this court stated, "We 
have previously ruled that evidence of flight is probative." 
In State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983), this court 
noted, ". . .our cases affirm the admissibility of evidence 
of flight [citations omitted]. . . ". This court's decision 
that evidence of flight is probative and admissible should 
have been regarded as binding by the Court of Appeals. 
3 
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Bales found that "clear evidence of contemporane-
ous flight" is a sufficient factual foundation for admission 
of flight evidence. Fisher offered clear evidence of 
contemporaneous flight through Trapp's own admission that he 
fled the scene immediately following the accident. Under 
Franklin and Bales, the evidence of Trapp's flight was 
probative and admissible. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals was contrary to precedents of this Court admitting 
flight evidencec 
POINT II 
CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE SO 
THAT THIS COURT CAN CORRECT THE 
APPEARANCE OF SEPARATE RULES EVIDENCE 
BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES IN UTAH 
The Court of Appeals distinguished Franklin and 
Bales on the ground that they arose "in the criminal 
context." However, Utah Rule of Evidence 101 states, 
"ftjhese rules govern proceedings in the courts of this 
state. . • " . The Advisory Committee Note adds that the 
Rules of Evidence are "applicable in all instances in the 
courts of this state." The Rules do not hint that evidence 
can be admissible in criminal cases, but not in civil cases. 
Rather, the Rules contemplate a unitary body of evidence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The Court of Appeals' opinion apparently regards 
evidence precedents set by this Court in criminal cases as 
not binding on lower courts in civil cases. If this error 
is not corrected, great confusion will result. No one will 
ever know whether a criminal opinion relating to evidence 
can be used in a civil trial, or vice versa. In short, 
certiorari should issue to maintain a single body of 
evidence law in Utah. If certiorari does not issue, 
evidence law in Utah may become polarized—that is, a body 
of criminal evidence will develop, and a body of civil 
evidence will develop. (It is true that the burden of proof 
differs in criminal and civil cases, but the law of evidence 
does not change.) 
In fairness, the Court of Appeals apparently felt 
that criminal cases are somehow inherently different from 
hit-and-run auto accidents. But any claimed distinction 
between flight evidence in an "action for negligence" and 
"in the criminal context" completely collapses in those 
cases where negligence and criminal conduct overlap. 
Criminal negligence cases involving auto accidents uniformly 
admit evidence of post-accident flight. 
For example, In State v. Pierce, 647 P.2d 847 
(Mont. 1982), a hit-and-run drunk driver was convicted of 
aggravated assault and criminal negligence. The Montana 
5 
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Supreme Court stated "Flight by the defendant may be 
considered by the jury as a circumstance tending to prove 
consciousness of guilt." Id- at 851. Admissibility of 
flight was upheld even though the defendant admitted causing 
the accident and even though there were ample witnesses. 
Evidence of post-accident flight was also admitted 
in the following cases? Clay v. State, 128 A.2d 634 (Md. 
1957)(prosecution for manslaughter based on gross 
negligence; defendant admitted he caused the accident); 
State v. Humbolt, 562 P. 2d 123 (Kan. App. 1977)(involuntary 
manslaughter conviction; admissible to show "consciousness 
of guilt"); People v. Allen, 14 N.E.2d 397 (111. 1938) 
(manslaughter based on wilful! and wanton negligence; de-
fendant admitted to accident); State v. Achter, 445 SoWJd 
318 (Mo. 1969)(evidence of post-accident flight considered 
on issue of culpable negligence). Presumably, the same 
dangers in admitting flight evidence exist in these criminal 
cases as in civil cases. 
The Court of Appeals' opinion contains the seeds 
of a separate body of evidence law in civil cases. A writ 
of certiorari should issue to make clear that decisions of 
this Court on evidence are binding, whether they appear in 
civil or criminal cases. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III 
CERTIORARI SHOULD ISSUE TO DECIDE 
WHETHER UTAH SHOULD ADOPT A POSITION 
CONTRARY TO THE VAST MAJORITY OF CIVIL CASES 
WHICH ADMIT EVIDENCE OF POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT 
The Court of Appeals admitted the admission of 
hit-and-run evidence is one of first impression in Utah. 
The Court of Appeals stated that "some other jurisdictions, 
.have admitted evidence of flight in civil cases." 
Actually, courts are nearly unanimous in admitting hit-and-
run evidence. State v. Ford, 146 A. 828 (Conn. 1929); 
Vuillemot v. August J. Calverie & Co., 125 So. 168 (La. 
1929); Greenwood v. Bailey, 184 So. 285 (Ala. 1938); Shaddy 
v. Daley, 76 P.2d 279 (Id. 1938); Hallman v. Cushman, 13 
S.E.2d 498 (So. Car. 1941); Petroleum Carrier Corporation v. 
Snyder, 161 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1947)(applying Georgia law); 
Brooks v. E.J. Willey Truck Transportation Co., 255 P.2d 801 
(Cal. 1953); Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2nd Cir. 
1962)(applying Vermont law); Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 
(E.D. So. Car. 1963); Busbee v. Quassier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla. 
1965); Gaul v. Noiva, 230 A.2d 591 (Conn. 1957) Jones v. 
Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 A.2d 558; Richards v. Office 
Products, 380 N.E.2d 725 (Ohio App. 1977); Johnson v. 
Austin, 280 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 1979); Waycott v. Northeast Ins. 
Co., 465 A.2d 854 (Me. 1983); Grzys v. Connecticut Co., 123 
7 
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Conn. 605, 198 A. 259 (1938); Shaddy v. Daley, supra. ; 
Langenstein v. Reynaud, 13 La. App. 272, 127 So. 764 (1930); 
Olofson v. Kilqallon, 291 N.E.2d 600 (Mass. 1973); Peterson 
v. Henning, 452 N.E.2d 135 (111. App. 1983). 
When the Court of Appeals rejected the 
admissibility of flight evidence in civil cases, it adopted 
what is very much a minority view. The only case cited by 
the Court of Appeals, Barnes v. Gaines, 668 P.2d 1175 (Okla. 
App. 1983), involved a driver who stole the investigating 
officer's car and then fled. The Court of Appeals found 
this to be "closely analogous" to Fisher's case. In fact, 
Barnes is the case least analogous on its facts to Fisher's 
case. 
The Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish 
cases cited by Fisher by creating four special "reasons" to 
admit flight. These special reasons (lack of eyewitnesses, 
denial of driver involvement, aggravation of injuries, 
serious factual disputes), do not appear in any of the 
cases. Instead, Fisher's cases admit flight evidence to 
show a defendant's consciousness of responsibility or guilt. 
Brooks v. Willey Truck Trans. Co., supra. , 255 P.2d 801; 
Grzys v. Connecticut Co., 123 Conn. 605, 198 A. 259 (1938); 
Shaddy v. Daley, 76 P.2d 279 (Id. 1938); Langenstein v. 
Raynaud, 13 La. App. 272, 127 So. 764 (1930). They admit 
Q 
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flight to create an inference of failing to keep a proper 
lookout. Jones v. Strelecki, 49 N.J. 513, 231 A.2d 558 
(N.J. 1967); Busbee v. Quarrier, 172 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1965); 
Vuillemot v. August J. Calverie Co., 125 So. 168 (La. 
1929). Finally, they admit post-accident failure to stop to 
evidence a wilfull, wanton or reckless state of mind at the 
time of impact. Hallman v. Cushman, 13 S.E.2d 498 (S.C. 
1941); Richards v. Office Products Co., 380 N.E.2d 725 (Ohio 
App. 1977); Dean v. Cole, 217 F.Supp. 280 (E.D.S.C. 1963). 
The Court of Appeals made the statement that the 
cases cited by Fisher did not admit evidence of post-
accident flight to show negligence. On the contrary, that 
is the reason why 19 civil cases have admitted such evi-
dence. 
The Court of Appeals committed Utah to a position 
rejected by the vast majority of courts. A writ of certi-
orari should issue to ensure that Utah's position on the 
issue is well considered. 
9 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED 
IN FINDING UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
FROM FLIGHT EVIDENCE 
The trial court found that the probative value of 
evidence Trapp's hit-and-run was substantially outweighed by 
unfair prejudice. However, the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals erred in finding unfair prejudice to Trapp. The 
only unfair prejudice identified by the Court of Appeals was 
the danger that Trapp may have had an innocent explanation 
for flight ("fear or remorse") which the jury might not 
believe. 
No other court has barred flight evidence on the 
ground that defendant may have an honest or innocent 
explanation. Instead, it is "for the jury to say, under all 
the circumstances, whether [defendant] departed because uf 
his consciousness of guilt." State v. Brokaw, 342 N.W.2d 
864, 865 (Iowa 1984). In other words, ". . .the existence 
of explanations—other than consciousness of guilt of the 
crime charged. . .is relevant to the weight of the evidence 
of flight, but not to its admissibility." People v. Perry, 
499 P.2d 129, 139 (Cal. 1972). See also, Comm. v> Toney, 
433 N.E.2d 425 (Mass. 1982). 
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A writ of certiorari should issue to consider 
whether the decisions of the trial court and the Court of 
Appeals improperly invade the province of the jury in 
weighing flight evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals' opinion would allow evidence 
of flight if Trapp were being prosecuted for drunk driving, 
but not when his innocent victim sues him. This rule is 
unfair to victims of criminal conduct. Also, a trial court 
trying a drunk driving or criminal negligence case would be 
hard-pressed to decide whether to apply the auto accident 
rule of Fisher or the criminal case rule of Franklin and 
Bales. 
The reality is that the same facts that support 
criminal liability also give rise to civil liability. Why 
should balancing under Rule 403 of the same facts result in 
admission in a criminal case, but not in a civil case? 
The Court of Appeals found prejudice in the danger 
that the jury will not believe other reasons the defendant 
has for fleeing (p. 107). This same danger exists in every 
criminal case (including Franklin and Bales). Why is the 
11 
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danger that the jury will discount the defendant's 
explanation so compelling in a civil case, yet not 
compelling in a criminal case? 
The rule laid down in the Court of Appeals' 
opinion is arbitrary and unfair to the victim in the civil 
context. It is contrary to the spirit and letter of prior 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court• Thus, a substantial 
inconsistency in precedent will result if the case is not 
reviewed by this Court. It creates an appearance of 
separate bodies of evidence law in criminal and civil cases. 
A writ of certiorari should be granted. 
DATED thisrr^ > day of 'YYl^dJl^Aj , 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
i 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-OOOOO 
Joshua Fisher, by and through ) 
his general guardian, ) 
Carla Fisher, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ) OPINION 
) (For Publication) 
v. - ) 
) 
Warren Trapp, ) Case No. 860359-CA 
) 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
F i I ^ ^ 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench and Billings. * fL» L« uJ JAN 011383 
GREENWOOD, J u d g e : Tamc.w/ M S ^ 
Cert of &e Con* 
Utah Court o* A£ •>*#•$ 
Plaintiff, Joshua Fisher (Fisher), initiated this action 
against defendant, Warren Trapp (Trapp),•after a 
pedestrian-automobile accident. The jury found no cause of 
action, and Fisher appeals, claiming that the trial judge erred 
in excluding evidence that defendant fled the scene of the 
accident. We affirm. 
At about 9:15 p.m. on June 3, 1982, Trapp hit Fisher 
while Trapp was driving north on Redwood Road in Salt Lake 
City. As Trapp approached 430 North on Redwood Road, Fisher, 
age nine, and his brother, Patrick Fisher, age twelve, were 
standing on the west side of the street waiting to cross. 
Fisher darted across Redwood Road and collided with the left 
front wheel area of Trapp's vehicle, landing about one foot 
from where the collision occurred. 
Following the collision, Trapp continued northbound, but 
returned to the accident site within a few minutes and saw an 
adult aiding Fisher. Trapp again left, returned shortly 
thereafter, and spoke to a police officer without identifying 
himself as the driver of the vehicle. Trapp then went to his 
home, and within thirty minutes of the accident, called the 
police and identified himself as the driver of the vehicle that 
had hit Fisher. 
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At trial, the two eyewitnesses to the accident, Fisher's 
brother, Patrick, and Trapp, testified. Fisher did not testify 
because he had no recollection of the accident. Patrick 
testified that he and Fisher were walking down Redwood Road 
when Fisher turned to cross the street in the middle of the 
block. Patrick said Fisher waited for three cars and then 
started crossing* Patrick saw the Trapp vehicle and yelled at 
Fisher as he ran into the road. Fisher turned back, looked 
like he was trying to come back and was then hit by the front 
left portion of Trapp's car,, Patrick ran to his brother, told 
him to lie still and ran to a house where he was told that an 
ambulance had been called. Trapp testified that he first knew 
an accident had occurred when he heard a thump and 
simultaneously saw Fisher at the left front fender of his car. 
Prior to trial, Trapp filed a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence that he failed to stop at the scene of the accident. 
Fisher contended the evidence was admissible to create an 
inference of defendant's consciousness of guilt. The judge 
excluded the evidence on the ground that its possible 
prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. 
During the trial, Val Shupe, an accident reconstruction 
expert, was called as a witness by Fisher to elicit his opinion 
of the cause of the accident. Trapp's objection to the 
testimony, based on inadequate foundation, was sustained. 
Later in the trial, after additional foundation was laid, Shupe 
was permitted to state his opinion of the cause of the accident. 
Fisher claims on appeal that the trial court committed 
reversible error by: 1)' excluding evidence concerning Trapp's 
flight from the scene o£ the accident; and 2) excluding Shupe°s 
testimony. 
I. 
We first consider whether evidence that Trapp left the 
scene of the accident was properly excluded. The trial court's 
rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence will not be 
disturbed unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in 
error. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
According to Utah R. Evid. 401, evidence is relevant if 
it has Many tendency to make the existence of any fact that is 
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
However, relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury 
. . . .
w
 Utah R. Evid. 403. 
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Evidence is unfairly prejudicial . . . if 
it has a tendency to influence the outcome 
of the trial by improper means, or if it 
appeals to the jury's sympathies, or 
arouses its sense of horror, provokes its 
instinct to punish or otherwise causes a 
jury to base its decision on something 
other than the established propositions of 
the case. 
Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 323 n.31 
(Utah 1979). 
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed whether evidence 
of flight from the scene of an accident is admissible in a civil 
action for negligence.1 However, some other jurisdictions 
confronted with the issue have admitted evidence of flight in 
civil cases. Evidence of flight has been admitted where the 
plaintiff's injuries were aggravated by the driver's failure to 
stop and render assistance. Brooks v. Willig Truck Transp. Co,, 
40 Cal.2d 669, 255 P.2d 802 (1953) (trial court did not err in 
instructing jury on the duty to stop and use reasonable care to 
prevent further injury where plaintiff's injuries were aggravated 
by defendant's failure to stop and render assistance); Hallman v. 
Cushman, 13 S.E.2d 498, 499-501 (S.C. 1941) (where defendant fled 
accident and flight may have aggravated plaintiff's injuries, no 
prejudicial error in instructing jury that flight evidence could 
be considered on punitive damages issue only after it was proven 
1. The Utah Supreme Court has, however, addressed the 
admissibility of flight evidence in the criminal context. State 
v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987); State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 
573 (Utah 1983); State v. Simpson, 120 Utah 596, 236 P.2d 1077 
(1951). In Franklin, the Court held, in a murder prosecution, 
that evidence of defendant's flight from custody was not 
erroneously admitted where the trial judge gave a cautionary 
instruction warning the jury not to give too much weight to the 
mere fact of flight without carefully considering the other 
motives, besides guilt, that may have influenced defendant. In 
Bales, the Utah Supreme Court stated that it was error to 
instruct the jury that flight from the scene of a crime 
constitutes an implied admission of guilt and that a flight 
instruction -will not be completely free from criticism unless it 
advises the jury that there may be reasons for flight fully 
consistent with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt 
is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual 
guilt of the crime charged." Bales, 675 P.2d at 575. Under the 
reasoning in these two cases, it appears that, at least in 
criminal cases, evidence of flight is circumspectly admitted and, 
if admitted, must be accompanied by specific instructions. 
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that defendant's vehicle was involved). Other courts have 
indicated that such evidence is admissible where the driver 
denied involvement in the accident. Dean v. Cole, 217 F. Supp. 
280 (E.DJS.C. 1963) (evidence was sufficient to establish that 
defendant's automobile proximately caused the pedestrian's 
death where defendant admitted owning the vehicle involved in 
t$e accident but did not recall what he did on the night of the 
-accident); Busbee v. Ouarrier, 172 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1965) 
(evidence, including evidence that the front grill of 
defendant's vehicle had been dented and that defendant fled the 
scene of the accident, supports jury's verdict that driver's 
negligence proximately caused death of boy who was hit from the 
rear while riding his bicycle). 
In some cases, courts have admitted evidence of flight 
where there were serious factual disputes in the evidence. 
Petroleum Carrier Corp, v. Snyder, 161 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1947) 
(where testimony was in dispute as to whether driver left the 
scene of the accident, instruction on flight proper); Shaddv 
v. Dalev, 58 Idaho 536, 76 PG2d 279, 282 (1938) (where there 
were disputed facts regarding whether defendant stopped at the 
accident scene, evidence of flight admissible). In addition, 
some courts have admitted evidence that defendant fled the 
scene of the accident where there were no eyewitnesses to the 
accident. Johnson v. Austin, 406 Mich. 420, 280 N.W.2d 9 
(1979) (where circumstances of accident unknown, evidence of 
flight gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that driver was 
at fault); Busbee, 172 So. 2d at 17* 
None of the cases cited admitted flight evidence for the 
purpose of proving defendant's alleged negligence, as Fisher 
attempted, nor do their underlying reasoning support its 
Admission in this case. Trapp's flight from the scene of the 
accident did not aggravate Fisher's injuries since a neighbor 
called an ambulance immediately after the accident. In 
addition, flight evidence was not necessitated by significant 
factual disputes or the absence of eyewitness testimony. Both 
Trapp and Patrick Fisher testified regarding the accident and 
their testimony did not conflict. Finally, evidence that Trapp 
fled the scene of the accident was not required to demonstrate 
that Trapp was the driver of the vehicle. Trapp contacted the 
police within thirty minutes of the accident and admitted that 
he was the driver of the vehicle that hit Fisher. 
Flight evidence has been excluded in other cases which 
more closely parallel this case. In Freeman v. Anderson, 279 
Ark. 282, 651 S.W.2d 450 (1983), flight evidence was found 
inadmissible as a basis to demonstrate wilful and wanton 
conduct required for an award of punitive damages. Freeman 
also reiterated the finding of an earlier case, that "failure 
of a driver to comply with the law requiring him to give his 
name, license number, etc. and render assistance to the 
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operator or persons injured in the other car had no bearing on 
the cause of the collision, and, therefore, the trial court 
properly refused to give an instruction on that matter." Id, 
at 452. ^Similarly, in Clark v. Mask, 232 Miss. 65, 98 So. 2d 
467 (1957), the court found that a presumption or inference of 
negligence does not arise from defendant's failure to stop at 
the scene of an accident in contravention of a statutory duty 
to do so, as the statutory duty applies to non-negligent as 
well as negligent persons. Lastly, in Barnes v. Gaines, 668 
P.2d 1175 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983), the court reviewed the trial 
court's admission of evidence that defendant stole a police car 
and fled the scene after an automobile collision. The court 
found that such evidence was not relevant to issues of 
negligence or plaintiffs damages 
or any other fact of consequence to the 
determination of the primary action 
between the parties* We, therefore, hold 
that the admission of evidence of the 
crime of stealing the police car after the 
accident . . . was error because it 
substantially affected the right of 
defendant Gaines to a fair trial on the 
primary issues before the jury. The 
probative value of the evidence was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice . . . . 
Id. at 1179. 
We find in this case, as in Barnes, that Trapp's flight 
from the scene of the accident had little, if any, relevance to 
Fisher's claim of negligence. In addition, even if the 
evidence were relevant, its probative value was overwelmingly 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Trapp's flight 
could have indicated fear or remorse just as easily as 
consciousness of guilt. Had the evidence been admitted, it 
could have confused or misled the jury. When the marginal 
relevance of the evidence is coupled with the potential 
prejudicial effect the evidence of flight may have had upon the 
jury, we believe the trial court acted well within its 
discretion in excluding the evidence. 
II. 
Fisher's second claim on appeal is that the trial court 
erred in excluding Shupe's opinion as to the cause of the 
accident. During the trial, Fisher's attorney attempted to 
elicit Shupe's opinion that Trapp was driving too fast and had 
an improper lookout. Trapp's attorney successfully objected, 
based on inadequate foundation, claiming that Shupe, an 
accident reconstruction expert, had not testified as to the 
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location on the road where Trapp could have seen Fisher and 
taken steps to avoid the accident. On the second day of trial, 
Shupe testified that during the recess he had returned to the 
scene of, the accident and asked Patrick Fisher where he and the 
Trapp vehicle were positioned when he first saw the vehicle. 
Shupe then stated that Trapp was 201 feet from Fisher when 
Fisher entered the road. Based on that foundation, the court 
permitted Shupe to state that, in his opinion, Trapp was 
proceeding too fast for the conditions and had an improper 
lookout. 
The trial court's determination of adequate foundation is 
solely within the discretion of the trial court. Tias v. 
Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979); see also Craio Food 
Indus, v. Weihincr, 71 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 47 (Utah App* 1987), 
According to Utah R. Evid. 705, "[t]he expert may testify in 
terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor 
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, 
unless the court requires otherwise.- Further, H[t]he 
admissibility of accident reconstruction evidence depends in 
large measure upon the foundation laid* The expertise of the 
witness, his degree of familiarity with the necessary facts, 
and the logical nexus between his opinion and the facts adduced 
must be established." Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328, 
1331 (Utah 1979). 
In this case, the trial court sustained Trapp's objection 
to Shupees opinion because Shupe did not have the necessary 
degree of familiarity with the facts. On the second day of 
trial, when Shupe had acquired the requisite familiarity, the 
judge allowed the testimony. Based on the facts present in 
this case, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 
Affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
860359-CA 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX B 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i Z ^ O £ I I ^ I ^ G S 
2 I *~ (Proceedings held in chambers.) 
3 THE COURT: Wefre on the record now. 
4 MR. HEATH: The evidence will show in this case 
5 that after the accident occurred that Mr. Trapp, the Defen-
6 dant in this case, continued to drive North for a distance, 
7 and then turned around and came back to the scene of the 
8 accident. At that time there was an adult who was there 
9 caring for the injured boy. 
10 He then left the area, came back again, talked 
11 to a police officer, still did not identify himself as the 
12 driver of the car, and then went home and called the police 
13 and advised them at that time that he was the driver of 
14 the car within approximately 30 minutes of the accident. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
I'm not sure of the exact time, but that had noen the best: 
estimate that we have. 
We believe the fact that he may have left the 
scene of the accident, technically the statute says you 
have a duty to render assistance if you can and to report 
an accident. We take the position that, in fact, when he 
came back and saw that there was an adult there rendering 
assistance, he's not a paramedic and so forth and has no 
knowledge of medicine. He couldn't have offered anything 
else. And the fact he later reported it, that: he satisfied 
the statute. 
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1 There was a charge to which he pled no contenda, 
2 I which was ultimately dismissed. 
3 I I don't think—let me represent, Les Richardson, 
4 and I talked to Mr. Richardson, I think all the facts that 
5 happened after the accident are immaterial tc how the 
6 accident happened. And I would make a motion and do make 
7 a motion nt this time that all the witnesses be instructed 
8 not to go into anything that would tend to indicate that 
9 Mr. Trapp left the scene of the accident for these reasons. 
10 One, it's immaterial. It has nothing to do with 
11 how the accident happened. 
12 And two, that it would be highly prejudicial 
13 to the jury, when we introduce prejudicial information that 
14 would deny him a right to a fair trial. 
15 MR. HANSEN: Do you have any Utah cases on that? 
16 MR. HEATH: .£ /think, it goes on the basis of just 
17 evidentiary matters that it happened after, and it's not 
18|admissible. 
19 MR. HANSEN: I have three cases. They are not 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Utah cases. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HANSEN: I don!t think anything should be 
said about the criminal charges. But it's certainly 
permissible inferences under the hopings of those three 
cases. They1re not terribly recent. 
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1 THE COURT: Let me see if I understand. Are 
2 you Taking the position as I read your Complaint, at least 
3 the Complaint alleged that his injuries may have been 
* aggravated or something? 
5 | MR. HANSEN: We don't really have any proof of 
6 that. 
7 THE COURT: Any evidence? 
8 I MR. HANSEN: The time was pretty quick that he 
9 got medical attention, and so we do not really claim any-
10 thing for that. 
11 THE COURT: So you're claiming the fact he didn't 
12 stop may have an inference of almost like an admission of 
13 guilt? 
14 MR. HANSEN: Right. Thatfs a permissible 
15 inference. It's certainly not conclusive, and we shouldn't 
16 'say anything about the criminal aspect of the thing. But 
17 I any course of conduct which afterwards explains a prior 
18 j mental state of mind, certainly would be. 
19 MR. HEATH: I'll submit the matter. 
20 THE COURT: Well, it seems to be something that 
21 could inflame the jury a little bit. I have some problems 
22 with it. I think if there was some evidence that the injury 
23 was aggravated, it clearly would be relevant. But I have 
24 a hard > ime seeing how, how it really bears on anything 
25 that occurred after the accident. 
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1 MR. HANSEN: Well, Your Honor, our position is 
2 that^there's two specific acts of negligence on behalf of 
3 the Defendant driver. 
* One, that he-was driving too fast for existing 
5 I circumstances, and second, that he failed to keep "a proper 
6 1 o<) k on! . 
7 Now, I think his own conduct is — speaks louder 
3 than words as to what he was doing. He says in his depc— 
9 sit ion, answered the questions, he didn't see this boy before 
10 the actual time of impact. But I think—I think that we 
11 can't--we ought not to be limited to that. If under the 
2^ theory of these cases that his conduct is something from 
13 which a reasonable inference can be drawn to show his state 
14 of mind at the time of impact of a feeling of guilt, that 
15 he contributed to that accident. 
16 THE COURT: Boy, I don't think so. I think the 
17 prejudicial effect of that outweighs the probative value. 
18 I think the probative value is very limited. I think I'm 
19 going to grant the motion in limine, ask you to tell your 
20 witnesses not to talk about those kinds of things. 
21 MR. HEATH: May I mention the way it could come 
22 up. 
23 One would be, it's my understanding that Patrick 
24 Fisher, the older brother, who was with the victim, was 
25 insensed by the fact that the driver didn't stop and 
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